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1 Introduction
Workhorse Inc. is a stock market listed company. The two largest blocks
of single held shares amount to 25% minus one share each. One of these
blocks is held by Crooks Ltd., the other by Rogue & Co. None of the three
companies has a majority shareholder. The CEO of the three ﬁrms is Mr.
Dagobert Duck, the champion among CEO’s when it comes to salaries. How
come?
Crooks Ltd. holds 50% minus one share in Rogue & Co. Likewise, Rogue
& Co. owns 50% minus one share of Crooks Ltd. Mr. Duck owns two shares
in each of the latter two companies, and three shares in Workhorse Inc.
When it comes to shareholder voting on the CEO (and his salary) for Crooks
Ltd., Mr. Duck and Rogue & Co. vote for Mr. Duck and the maximum
salary. Since this coalition amounts to 50% plus one share in Crooks Ltd.,
Mr. Duck gets established. For Rogue & Co. the shares held by Crooks
Ltd. and Mr. Duck ensure that also here Mr. Duck gets paid a generous
salary as the CEO. Finally, when it comes to Workhorse Inc., the votes cast
by Crooks Ltd., Rogue & Co., and Mr. Duck amount to 50% plus one share
and establish Mr. Duck as the CEO at the best salary ever. Any move to
unseat Mr. Duck would be doomed to fail.
The only expenses that Mr. Duck faces in building his empire is the price
for three shares in Workhorse Inc. and for two shares in each of Crooks
Ltd. and Rogue & Co. Since the market value of the latter two amounts
to approximately one quarter of the value of Workhorse Inc., his expenses
are an equivalent of four shares in Workhorse Inc. Hence, four (indirectly
owned) shares are enough for control.
The hypothetical CEO “Dagobert Duck” introduced above is a particu-
lar example of the separation of ﬁrm ownership from control of the ﬁrm, in
the presence of cross-ownership between ﬁrms. The separation of ownership
from control is a well-studied problem in economics, ﬁnance and law (see e.g.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a recent survey on corporate governance). It
has long been recognized, for example, that pyramiding of ﬁrms, in which a
chain of ﬁrms is constructed to control voting rights in a target ﬁrm, may al-
low an individual with only marginal cash ﬂow rights in the target company
to nonetheless control voting rights by controlling each ﬁrm in the chain.
And in preferred voting stock arrangements, an investor with strict minor-
ity shareholding may control enough voting stock to dictate control of the
company. [See Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (1999), La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) and Faccio
and Lang (2001) for examples of pyramiding and preferred voting stock in
both theoretical and empirical analysis.]
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Pyramids are little else than an example of cross-ownership relations
among ﬁrms. The precise quantitative eﬀect of cross-ownership between
ﬁrms is, however, diﬃcult to capture, both at the theoretical and the em-
pirical level. Recently, authors such as Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000)
and Faccio and Lang (2001) have presented very detailed empirical results
which investigate the ownership structures in East Asia and Western Eu-
rope, respectively. While they show ample evidence of pyramid structures
(and somewhat less evidence of preferred voting stock) their treatment is
hampered by the diﬃculty of capturing cross-ownership eﬀects. Claessens
et al. (2000), for example, state that
[t]he presence of cross-holdings creates some diﬃculties in mea-
suring cash-ﬂow and voting rights. Imagine that ﬁrm A owns
50% of ﬁrm B which, in turn, owns 25% of ﬁrm A. How should
ﬁrm A be classiﬁed?....[W]e classify ﬁrm A as controlled by ﬁrm
B at the 20% cutoﬀ level. (Claessens et al. 2000, p. 93)
In Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2001) cash ﬂow rights for
cross-ownership structures are left ambiguous, while voting control is taken
as a ﬂoor (in the above example, 20%) of the respective cash-ﬂow rights each
ﬁrm holds in the other. The authors thus specify cross-ownership eﬀects in
much the same way as pyramiding, in which the ﬁnal ownership of a company
is the product of ownership shares along a chain of ﬁrms, while voting rights,
on the other hand, are simply the minimum shareholding value along the
entire chain.
On the theoretical side, several authors have attempted to deﬁne cross-
ownership eﬀects using the pyramid structure as a template. In Bebchuk
et al. (1999), for example, cross-ownership eﬀects are simply deﬁned as the
sum of an individual investor’s direct ownership in a target ﬁrm, plus the
shares of ownership of that investor in other ﬁrms, each of which own a part
of the target ﬁrm (indirect ownership). This treatment is insuﬃcient because
cross-ownership so deﬁned does not include the recursion between ﬁrms who
own shares of each other (“A owns part of B, B owns part of A, so A owns
part of B’s ownership of A, which is also part of a part of A’s ownership of
B, which is. . . ”). This recursion must be addressed, as it allows for a much
greater dispersion of control mechanisms using incremental cash ﬂow rights
(as in Dagobert Duck, above) than a simple quasi-pyramid calculation would
reveal. Bolle and Gu¨th (1992) attempt to take this eﬀect into consideration,
but do not oﬀer a full treatment of the possible ownership structures as there
is assumed to exist a controlling shareholder a priori for each ﬁrm.
Using accounting identities we present measurements of both cash ﬂow
rights and voting rights which diﬀer from previous research. First, they
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result from a full treatment of cross-ownership relationships between ﬁrms,
including the inﬁnite recursion between many ﬁrms all of whom may have
cross-holdings in each other. These measurements lead to the possibility of
greater control of voting rights for a given degree of cross-ownership and
cash ﬂow rights than the minimum-along-a-chain or ﬂoor criterion described
above. That is, current estimates of the separation of ownership and control
are generally too low when the full identities are taken into consideration.
In addition, the identities also allow us to deﬁne control coeﬃcients that
indicate when an investor exercises full control over a particular ﬁrm. These
control coeﬃcients are used to calculate both the necessary conditions and
the suﬃcient conditions for control of a ﬁrm, in which the required share-
holding percentage for control need not be greater than the 50% benchmark
commonly used in current research. Both the identities and the necessary
and suﬃcient conditions are developed with several examples, showing along
the way that it is possible for a given economy (i.e. a given set of investors
and ﬁrms with a given level of cross-ownership) to possess multiple equilibria:
in one equilibrium there is full voting rights control by the shareholder with
majority cash ﬂow rights in a particular ﬁrm, while in the other equilibrium
cash ﬂow rights and voting rights are completely separated. In fact, in the
second equilibrium an investor may exercise full control of voting rights in a
given ﬁrm while at the same time owning an arbitrarily small amount of the
ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow rights.
Section 2 introduces the accounting identities and also demonstrates that
under cross-ownership the book value of a ﬁrm will tend to be overestimated
with respect to the underlying cash ﬂows. Section 3 presents the mechanism
for calculating the control coeﬃcients. The existence of multiple equilibria is
also demonstrated by example. Section 4 calculates the necessary conditions
and the suﬃcient conditions for controlling a ﬁrm, and deﬁnes the voting
equilibrium in which relative majority ownership is suﬃcient for control.
An algorithm for passing from the suﬃcient to the necessary condition is
also outlined. Section 5 concludes and provides a brief summary of current
research into the speciﬁcation of a full model, and the empirical testing of
data using the algorithm deﬁned in Section 4.
2 Accounting Identities
Consider an economy with consumers/investors i = 1, ..., n and ﬁrms j =
1, ...,m. Let ϑij ≥ 0 denote the share of ﬁrm j owned by consumer/investor
i, and denote by σij ≥ 0 the share in ﬁrm j owned by ﬁrm i (i.e., the ﬁrst
subscript denotes the owner and the second the ﬁrm which is owned). Denote
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the n × m matrix of ﬁrm shares held by consumers/investors by Ξ = [ϑij]
(where i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m) and the m × m matrix of ﬁrm shares
held by other ﬁrms by Σ = [σij] (where i, j = 1, ...,m). By deﬁnition, for
each ﬁrm j = 1, ...,m it must be true that
m∑
i=1
σij +
n∑
i=1
ϑij = 1
for all j = 1, ...,m. Writing e = (1, 1, ..., 1) for the summation (row) vector,
in matrix notation this boils down to
eΣ + eΞ = e (1)
Assume that there is an upper limit δ on the share of a ﬁrm that can be held
by other ﬁrms with 0 < δ < 1. Then eΣ ≤ δe  e implies that the matrix
(I − Σ) (where I denotes the identity) has a dominant diagonal, because
1 − σjj >
∑
i=j |−σij| for all j = 1, ...,m. Hence, (I − Σ)−1 exists and (1)
can be rewritten as
eΞ (I − Σ)−1 = e (2)
The n×m matrix Θ of imputed ownership shares θij in ﬁrm j = 1, ...,m for
consumers/investors i = 1, ..., n is, therefore, given by
Θ = [θij] = Ξ (I − Σ)−1 (3)
(Note that (2) states that e is a left eigenvector of Θ with associated real
eigenvalue 1.) In other words, if consumer/investor i holds direct shares
ϑi = (ϑij)j=1,...,m in ﬁrms, her ultimate shares in distributed proﬁts (imputed
shares) are given by (the row vector)
θi = (θij)j=1,...,m = ϑi (I − Σ)−1 (4)
for all i = 1, ..., n.
Let π = (πj)j=1,...,m denote the (column) vectors of ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows (or
liquidation values, or net present value of dividends) and Π = (Πj)j=1,...,m
the (column) vector of eﬀective proﬁts of ﬁrms. The eﬀective proﬁt (or book
value) Πj of ﬁrm j consists of its cash ﬂow plus the revenue from ownership
in other ﬁrms,
Πj = πj +
m∑
i=1
σjiΠi
for all j = 1, ...,m. In matrix notation this boils down to
Π = π + ΣΠ = (I − Σ)−1 π (5)
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In other words, the sum of consumer/investor i’s direct shares in proﬁts
equals the sum of her imputed shares in cash ﬂows,
ϑiΠ = ϑi (I − Σ)−1 π = θiπ (6)
for all i = 1, ..., n. And, therefore, in the aggregate the sum of all distributed
proﬁts equals the sum of all cash ﬂows,
eΞΠ = eΞ (I − Σ)−1 π = eΘπ = eπ (7)
using (2).
This also holds for ﬁrms’ output vectors, rather than cash ﬂow. Suppose
ﬁrm j = 1, ...,m produces an output (row) vector xj net of what it receives
from other ﬁrms. Then, its gross output (row) vector yj is given by
yj = xj +
m∑
i=1
σjiyi
or, with X = [xjl] resp. Y = [yjl] (where l denotes the commodity index)
denoting the matrix of ﬁrms’ net resp. gross outputs,
Y = X + ΣY = (I − Σ)−1X
Therefore, consumer i = 1, ..., n receives
ϑiY = ϑi (I − Σ)−1X = θiX
so that eΞY = eΞ (I − Σ)−1X = eΘX = eX guarantees that the total
outputs by all ﬁrms is entirely distributed to consumers.
Denote by v = (I − Σ)−1 e the (column) vector of row sums of the matrix
(I − Σ)−1 and by V = diag v the diagonal matrix with the vj’s on its diagonal
(j = 1, ...,m). Since
(I − Σ)−1 =
∞∑
t=0
Σt (8)
it follows from Σ ≥ 0 that v =∑∞t=0Σte ≥ e with at least one strict inequality
if Σ is not identically zero. Therefore, V −1 (I − Σ)−1 e = e implies that
(I − Σ)−1 is the product of a matrix V −1 (I − Σ)−1 the rows of which (are
nonnegative and) sum to 1 and a diagonal matrix V the diagonal elements
of which are at least 1, because (I − Σ)−1 = V V −1 (I − Σ)−1.
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2.1 Firm Book Values
Using this construction, the proﬁt Πj of ﬁrm j (= 1, ...,m) can be perceived
as a weighted average ejV
−1 (I − Σ)−1 π (where ej is a row vector of zeros
except for a 1 at the j-th position) of all ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows times an expansion
factor vj ≥ 1, i.e.,
Πj = vjejV
−1 (I − Σ)−1 π (9)
which increases the ﬁrm’s book value beyond a weighted average of all ﬁrms’
cash ﬂows. Obviously, if Σ ≡ 0 then Πj = πj for all j = 1, ...,m. Hence,
the vector v = (I − Σ)−1 e, in a sense, measures the bias that is introduced
by cross-ownership among ﬁrms in the transition from cash ﬂows to book
values. By (8) this is always an upward bias. Hence, cross-ownership among
ﬁrms leads to an overvaluation of book values.
If there is an isolated group of companies in the economy which own each
other, but no company outside this conglomerate, and no company outside
the conglomerate owns any company belonging to it, then the matrix Σ
decomposes (possibly by suitable permutations) into zero matrices and a
smaller matrix Σ˜ ≥ 0,
Σ =
(
Σ˜ 0
0 0
)
such that also the matrix (I − Σ)−1 decomposes by
(I − Σ)−1 =
( (
I − Σ˜
)−1
0
0 I
)
and the eﬀects of cross-ownership within the conglomerate can be analysed
independently from ﬁrms outside of it. The term “conglomerate” will be
reserved for such cases where there is a subset J ⊂ {1, ...,m} such that
σij > 0 implies i, j ∈ J . The following is an example of the book valuation
bias which is introduced when cross–ownership in a conglomerate is present.
In this case, two companies in a conglomerate owning each other is equivalent
to both owning themselves, and drives their book values upwards.
Example 1 Consider a conglomerate of two companies j = 1, 2 where each
either owns shares in itself or in the other company. For α, β ∈ (0, 1) let
Σ1 =
(
α 0
0 β
)
and Σ2 =
(
0 β
α 0
)
be the associated matrices of cross-ownerships. Then
(I − Σ1)−1 =
( 1
1−α 0
0 1
1−β
)
and (I − Σ2)−1 = 1
1− αβ
(
1 β
α 1
)
6
and the two companies’ book values are given
Π1 = (I − Σ1)−1 π =
( π1
1−α
π2
1−β
)
and Π2 = (I − Σ2)−1 π =
(
π1+βπ2
1−αβ
π2+απ1
1−αβ
)
where π  0 is assumed for convenience. Now let β be chosen such that
β = β (α, π) =
απ1
(1− α) π2 + απ1 ∈ (0, 1)
Then 1− αβ = (1− α) [π2 + απ1] / [(1− α) π2 + απ1] implies that Π21 = π11−α
and Π22 =
π2
1−β , precisely as in the case where each company owns shares in
itself, i.e., β = β(α, π)⇒ Π2 = Π1.
Now start from a situation without cross-ownership, Σ = 0. The man-
agers of the two companies hold stock options (on stocks of their own com-
panies) with exercise prices qj above πj for j = 1, 2. They decide to merge
the two companies. The merger is ﬁnanced by exchanging α newly issued
ﬁrm 1 shares against β newly issued ﬁrm 2 shares. Issuing shares will di-
lute seasoned shares by 1 − α for ﬁrm 1 and by 1 − β for ﬁrm 2 shares.
If, however, β is chosen such that β = β (α, π) as above, then a pre-issue
share ϑi1 (resp. ϑi2) held by shareholder i amounts to pre-issue claims ϑi1π1
(resp. ϑi2π2) and to (diluted) post-issue claims (1− α)ϑi1Π21 = ϑi1π1 (resp.
(1− β)ϑi2Π22 = ϑi2π2). Therefore, all shareholders in both companies are
indiﬀerent as to the ﬁnancial consequences of the merger.
But the emerging cross-ownership increases the ﬁrms’ proﬁts from πj to
Π2j = Π
1
j > πj for j = 1, 2. Hence, since proﬁts and, thus, market values
of shares now rise, the managers of the two companies can exercise their
stock options (at qj for j = 1, 2) and sell the so acquired shares at stock
prices Π2j = Π
1
j at the spot market. This is a proﬁtable operation for both
managers, provided α is chosen suﬃciently large such that
π1 < q1 <
π1
1− α and π2 < q2 <
π2
1− β(α, π)
which is always possible by making α suﬃciently large (because ∂β(α, π)/∂α >
0, β(0, π) = 0, and β(1, π) = 1).
The managers’ gains Π2j − qj > 0 come at no cost and are undetectable as
insider trading, because the option contracts were written before the merger.
Moreover, the transaction of newly issued shares between the two ﬁrms satis-
ﬁes a quid-pro-quo in post-issue stock values, because at β = β(α, π) we have
βΠ22 =
α
1−απ1 = αΠ
2
1, so that managers cannot be blamed for negotiating
distortive pricing either.
7
In general, a conglomerate can always increase (the sum of) its book
value(s) beyond (the sum of) its cash ﬂow(s). For, if Σ˜e 0 then
(
I − Σ˜
)−1
e =
∞∑
t=0
Σ˜te e
so that vj > 1 for all j which belong to the conglomerate. Note that in the
previous example the two companies could achieve Σ2 from Σ1 by simply
swapping the shares they hold in themselves.
Hence, if ﬁrms have an incentive to increase their proﬁts (book values)
beyond their cash ﬂows, then they can achieve this by a suitable choice
of cross-ownership structure. As a consequence, if there is nonzero cross-
ownership among ﬁrms in an economy the aggregate book value of the ﬁrm
sector overestimates the aggregate value of cash ﬂows produced by ﬁrms.
This is because consumers/investors hold less than the total stock of ﬁrms,
yet ultimately receive the total liquidation value of the ﬁrm sector.
3 Separating Ownership and Control
Complicated ownership structures may divorce stock ownership from control
over a company at almost no cost. The most obvious example of this is a
pyramid:
Example 2 Let Σ be given by σij ∈ (0, 1) for j = i − 1 ≥ 1 and σij = 0
otherwise, i.e., for i ≥ 2 company i owns σi,i−1 > 0 shares in company i− 1,
but in no other company, and company i = 1 owns no ﬁrm shares. If
aij =


1 if i = j∏i−1
k=j σh+1,h if 1 ≤ j ≤ i− 1
0 if i < j
then −σi,i−1ai−1,j + aij = 0 if i < j, −σi,i−1ai−1,j + aij = 1 if i = j, and
−σi,i−1ai−1,j + aij =
∏i−1
k=j σh+1,h − σi,i−1
∏i−2
k=j σh+1,h = 0 if i > j. Therefore,
A = [aij] = (I − Σ)−1.
Assume now that σj,j−1 = σ ∈ (0, 1) and that π1 > 0 = πj for all j ≥ 2.
Then aij = σ
i−j if 1 ≤ j ≤ i and aij = 0 if i < j. Hence, Πj = σj−1π1
and θkj =
∑
i aijϑki =
∑
i≥j σ
i−jϑki for any shareholder k and all ﬁrms j.
Now consider a shareholder k who owns ϑkm >
1
2
shares of company j = m
and suppose that σ > 1
2
. Then each company j ≥ 2 holds a majority in
company j−1 and, therefore, shareholder k has full control over all companies
j = 1, ...,m. Yet, the cost of buying majority control in company j = 1 by
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buying ϑkm amounts only to ϑkmσ
m−1π1 ≈ 2−mπ1 →m→∞ 0 if ϑkm and σ are
close enough to 1
2
.
Buying control in a company without buying a signiﬁcant claim to its
returns may be motivated, for example, by risk preferences or by the mere
attempt of management to retain control against the will of shareholders.1
Cross-ownership in particular may also be motivated by a desire for collusion
between ﬁrms under imperfect competition (Macho-Stadler and Verdier 1991,
Spagnolo 1998). It is, however, more diﬃcult to capture the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for control under cross-ownership than it is for pyramids,
as the entire matrix of ﬁrm cross-ownerships must be considered. Develping
a complete model to assess the necessary conditions for control would require
specifying a game where investors strategically attempt to gain control by
buying into or founding holding companies, or cartels which own each other
(this is one direction of our current research–see section 5 for some brief
remarks).
But as a ﬁrst step in this direction it is useful to develop a tool which
allows one to check if, for a given structure of cross-ownership, a particular
control structure is an equilibrium. For example, it is clear that the “Dagob-
ert Duck” CEO from the Introduction can exercise full control while holding
only a fraction of the cash ﬂow rights of the target ﬁrm. But is this the only
outcome? Is it possible that in this same economy there might also exist an
equilibrium in which a majority holder of cash ﬂow rights exercises full con-
trol? We seek in this case a suﬃcient condition for control, so that it might
be possible to check if a given control structure is in fact an equilibrium.
3.1 Control Coeﬃcients
To formalize such a suﬃcient condition, introduce a “control parameter” cij
for i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m with cij ∈ {0, 1}. The interpretation is
that cij = 1 if consumer/investor i controls company j, and cij = 0 if not.
For each j = 1, ...,m let hj : [0, 1] → {0, 1} be the heavyside function with
respect to a parameter ηj ∈ (0, 1), i.e.,
hj(x) =
{
1 if x > ηj
0 if x ≤ ηj (10)
and for an m-vector x = (x1, ..., xm) ∈ [0, 1]m deﬁne
h(x) ≡ (h1 (x1) , ..., hm (xm)) (11)
1See e.g. Hansen and Lott, Jr. (1996) for a treatment of cross-ownership as a means
for portfolio diversiﬁcation and risk-smoothing.
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componentwise.2 Then, require that the vectors ci = (ci1, ..., cim) ∈ {0, 1}m
satisfy the (n+ 1)m conditions
h (ϑi + ciΣ) = ci and
n∑
k=1
ck ≤ e (12)
for all i = 1, ..., n simultaneously. In other words, if investor i controls
companies, whose joint shareholdings in company j together with her own
share in company j exceed the fraction ηj of the shares in j, then she controls
company j. In the previous example both (c1, c2) = ((1, 1, 1) , (0, 0, 0)) and
(c1, c2) = ((0, 0, 0) , (1, 1, 1)) are solutions to the system (12) for ηj = 1/2 for
j = 1, 2, 3.
If some parameter ηj is strictly smaller than 1/2 a possible complication
arises. There could be i, h ∈ {1, ..., n} such that i = h and ϑιj+
∑m
k=1 cιkσkj >
ηj for both ι = i, h. Then ci = ch = 1 would hold. Yet, 1 ≥ ϑij + ϑhj +∑m
k=1 (cik + chk)σkj > 2ηj implies ηj < 1/2. Therefore, ηj = 1/2 for all
j = 1, ...,m is suﬃcient for (12) to have a solution. This follows from the
fact that the left hand side of the ﬁrst equation is nondecreasing in ci and
has a ﬁnite range, for all i = 1, ..., n.
If ηj is smaller than 1/2 for some j = 1, ...,m we need a diﬀerent technique
to assign control coeﬃcients. Let C = [cij] with i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m
be the matrix of control coeﬃcients. They need to be (real) solutions to the
following optimization problem:
max
C
eCe
s.t.
[
ϑi + ciΣ−
∑
j =i
(ϑj + cjΣ)
]
diag (ci) ≥ 0 and (13)
ci [I − diag (ci)] = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n,
and eC ≤ e
Note that the second of the three constraints is only there to ensure that
cij ∈ {0, 1}.
A suﬃcient condition for cij = 0 is that ϑij +
∑m
k=1 σkj ≤ ηj, because
cij = 1⇒ ηj < ϑij +
m∑
k=1
cikσkj ≤ ϑij +
m∑
k=1
σkj
Hence, if cross ownership among ﬁrms is legally restricted such that
∑m
k=1 σkj ≤
ηj − α, for α ∈ (0, 1/2), then it takes a minimum of α privately held shares
2The parameter ηj will usually be ηj = 1/2 if all shares are voting stock. If there is
preferred stocks outstanding, ηj may be less than 1/2.
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to control a company. In this sense the sum of outstanding (voting) stock in
the hands of other ﬁrms,
∑m
k=1 σkj, measures how vulnerable company j is
to control divorced from ownership (if, say, ηj = 1/2 for all j).
Let the n × m matrix C = [cij] be a solution to the system (12) and
partition ﬁrms into a set J1 (C) = {1, ..., k} (without loss of generality) of
ﬁrms for which there is i = 1, ..., n such that cij = 1, and a set of ﬁrms
J0 (C) = {k + 1, ...,m} (w.l.o.g.) which do not have a majority shareholder,
i.e.,
∑n
i=1 cij = 0 for all j ∈ J0 (C). Denote by Λ∗ = Λ∗ (C) the diagonal
m × m matrix which has λ∗jj = 1 as its diagonal element if and only if
j ∈ J0 (C) and zero entries otherwise, i.e., Λ∗ (C) = diag (e− eC), and deﬁne
Σ∗ = Σ∗ (C) ≡ ΣΛ∗ and Ξ∗ = Ξ∗ (C) ≡ ΞΛ∗ + C (14)
Since eΣ∗ = eΣΛ∗ ≤ eΣ, the matrix I − Σ∗ has an inverse, whenever I − Σ
has, i.e., whenever eΣ e. Using (1) one obtains from (14) that
eΣ∗ + eΞ∗ = e (Σ + Ξ)Λ∗ + eC = eΛ∗ + eC = e− eC + eC = e
i.e., the modiﬁed matrices Σ∗ (C) and Ξ∗ (C) form a consistent share distri-
bution. Since eΞ∗ (I − Σ∗)−1 = e, the voting/controlled eﬀective shares of
investor i can now be deﬁned by
θ∗i = θ
∗
i (C) ≡ (ϑiΛ∗ + ci) (I − Σ∗)−1 (15)
The voting/controlled eﬀective shares from (15) will be the ones which deter-
mine ﬁrm decisions. Hence, if it comes to voting in a shareholder assembly
at all, then only investors vote in it, and not other ﬁrms. So, there is no issue
of cross-voting.
We highlight the control coeﬃcient technique by reconsidering the Dagob-
ert Duck example from the Introduction, showing that in addition to the
equilibrium originally presented, in which the CEO controls all voting rights
with no cash ﬂow rights, there also exists an equilibrium in which full cash
ﬂow rights also imply full voting rights control:
Example 3 (Dagobert Duck) Let there be two consumers/investors i = 1, 2
and three ﬁrms j = 1, 2, 3 with
Σ =

 0 0 01
4
− ε 0 1
2
− ε
1
4
− ε 1
2
− ε 0

 and Ξ = ( 3ε 2ε 2ε1
2
− ε 1
2
− ε 1
2
− ε
)
for some small ε > 0. Using (3) the true ownership distribution is given by
Θ =
1
1 + 2ε
(
5ε− 2ε2 4ε 4ε
1− 3ε+ 2ε2 1− 2ε 1− 2ε
)
→ε↓0
(
0 0 0
1 1 1
)
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i.e., consumer/investor i = 2 (approximately) owns all three ﬁrms. When
it comes to control, however, the system (12) has multiple solutions. In one
equilibrium, investor i = 2 does not control any of the ﬁrms, despite owning
all of them. For the control coeﬃcient c2 = (0, 0, 0) is a solution to system
(12): for each ﬁrm j = 1, 2, 3 we have
h
(
1
2
− ε
)
→ε↓0 0 = c2j.
In this case investor i = 1 (“Dagobert Duck”) controls all three ﬁrms while
owning an arbitrarily small amount of each ﬁrm.
In the other equilibrium investor i = 2 controls all three ﬁrms, i.e. c2 =
(1, 1, 1). System (12) also has the solution
h
(
1
2
− ε+
3∑
j=1
σj1
)
= h (1− 3ε)→ε↓0 1 = c21,
h
(
1
2
− ε+
3∑
j=1
σj2
)
= h (1− 2ε)→ε↓0 1 = c22,
h
(
1
2
− ε+
3∑
j=1
σj3
)
= h (1− 2ε)→ε↓0 1 = c23.
Here full control of cash ﬂow rights and voting rights coincide for investor
i = 2.
In Example 3 we have for the two solutions to (12),
C1 =
[
1 1 1
0 0 0
]
and C2 =
[
0 0 0
1 1 1
]
and the two associated matrices Λ∗l = diag (e− eCl) = 0 for l = 1, 2 that
Θ∗ (Cl) = (ΞΛ∗l + Cl) (I − ΣΛ∗l )−1 = Cl, i.e., J0(Cl) = ∅ for l = 1, 2 and all
companies are controlled by one of the two investors.
However, it is not true that a shareholder who owns more than half the
dividend rights according to (4) will always be able to control the company.
The following modiﬁcation of Example 3 shows this.
Example 4 (resumed) Replace in Example 3 the second shareholder, who
originally owned 1/2− ε shares in all companies, by two shareholders, letting
Ξ =

 3ε 2ε 2ε1
2
− ε 1
2
− ε 0
0 0 1
2
− ε


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yielding imputed shares
Θ =


ε(5−2ε)
1+2ε
4ε
1+2ε
4ε
1+2ε
3(1−2ε)
4(1+2ε)
2(1−2ε)
3+4ε−4ε2
(2ε−1)2
3+4ε−4ε2
(1−2ε)(1−4ε)
4(1+2ε)
(2ε−1)2
3+4ε−4ε2
2(1−2ε)
3+4ε−4ε2

→ε↓0

 0 0 03
4
2
3
1
3
1
4
1
3
2
3


by (3). For small enough ε > 0 investor i = 2 owns the majority of dividend
rights in companies j = 1 and 2, and investor i = 3 owns the majority of
dividend rights (imputed shares) in company j = 3. But c2j = 0 for all
j = 1, 2, 3. For, since ϑ23 = 0, we have from (12) that
ϑ23 +
3∑
j=1
c2jσj3 = c22
(
1
2
− ε
)
≤ 1
2
− ε < 1
2
implies c23 = 0 which, in turn, implies
ϑ22 +
3∑
j=1
c2jσj2 =
1
2
− ε+ c23
(
1
2
− ε
)
=
1
2
− ε < 1
2
and, therefore, c22 = 0. It follows that
ϑ21 +
3∑
j=1
c2jσj1 =
1
2
− ε < 1
2
implies c21 = 0, i.e., c2 = 0. That is, while investor i = 2 owns approximately
three quarters of all dividend rights in company j = 1 (and two thirds of
dividend rights in company j = 2), she cannot control any of the companies.
Similarly, because for j = 1, 2
ϑ3j +
3∑
k=1
c3kσkj =
3∑
k=1
c3kσkj ≤ 1
2
− ε < 1
2
it follows from (12) that c31 = c32 = 0. Therefore, ϑ33+
∑3
j=1 c3jσj3 =
1
2
−ε <
1
2
implies also c31 = 0, i.e., c3 = 0. That is, investor i = 3 cannot control
any of the companies either - not even company j = 3, where she owns two
thirds of the dividend rights (imputed shares) according to (4).
On the other hand,
ϑ1 + eΣ =
(
1
2
+ ε
)
e 1
2
e
still implies that investor i = 1, who owns negligible dividend rights in all
three companies, can control all companies, i.e., for i = 1 (12) has the solu-
tion ci = c1 = e.
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This calculus of control also reveals that in Example 2 majority control
of company m is necessary and suﬃcient for controlling all companies.
Example 5 (resumed) Assume that in Example 2 (the pyramid) σij > 0⇒
σij > 1/2. (Recall that σij > 0 implies i = j+1.) Now suppose that ϑim > 1/2
for some investor i. Then ϑij +
∑m
k=1 σkj ≥
∑m
k=1 σkj = σj+1,j > 1/2 for all
j = 1, ...,m implies that ci = e is a solution to (12).
Conversely, if cij = 1 for some j = 1, ...m, then (12) implies ϑij +∑m
k=1 cikσkj = ϑij + ci,j+1σj+1,j > 1/2 and, therefore, ci,j+1 = 1, because
if ci,j+1 = 0 then from σj+1,j > 1/2 it follows that ϑij < 1/2, yielding
ϑij +
∑m
k=1 cikσkj = ϑij < 1/2 in contradiction to the hypothesis. Hence,
cij = 1 implies cik = 1 for all k = j, ...,m. But then ϑi,j−1+
∑m
k=1 cikσk,j−1 =
ϑi,j−1 + cijσj,j−1 ≥ σj,j−1 > 1/2 implies ci,j−1 = 1, too. Therefore, that there
is some j such that cij = 1 implies ci = e. In particular, cim = 1. The latter
implies ϑim > 1/2, because σjm = 0 for all j = 1, ...,m.
We see that the control coeﬃcients allow for a concise identiﬁcation of
the conditions of ownership–once the coeﬃcients are determined, the econ-
omy may be recast into one in which the controlling investors own the entire
ﬁrm that they (directly or indirectly) control, and the ﬁrm shareholdings are
adjusted accordingly. The problem of ﬁrm cross-voting is thereby avoided.
In addition, we see how regulations which limit cross-ownership help to de-
termine the susceptibility of a particular ﬁrm to having its dividend rights
separated from its voting rights.
In the presence of cross-ownership the standard approach of measuring
cash ﬂow right and voting rights (see Introduction) will generally underesti-
mate the degree of separation of ownership from control. Current research
generally selects a minimum level, or ﬂoor, of cash ﬂow rights in a cross-
holding of ﬁrms as the level of voting rights enjoyed by one ﬁrm over another.
We may adopt with some qualiﬁcation the term ‘weakest link’3 for this voting
rights ﬂoor, as the minimum of cash ﬂow rights translates directly into the
voting rights.
By contrast, the approach presented here relies solely upon the eﬀec-
tive shareholdings to determine whether or not investor i controls a (set of)
ﬁrm(s), using (14). These shareholdings are determined by the entire matrix
of ﬁrm ownership, whereas the conventional approach avoids the recursion
problem entirely (thus implicitly setting the other matrix entries to zero).
The voting rights of the ‘weakest link’ approach thus oﬀer a lower bound of
the degree of voting rights for a given set of cash ﬂow rights, under a given
3Faccio et al. (2001) p. 56; the term as originally used was for the minimum cash ﬂow
rights of a chain of ﬁrms in a pyramid.
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ownership structure. In general the control of voting rights will be greater
under cross-ownership than this lower bound, which means that the degree
of separation of ownership from control in the current literature is generally
underestimated in the presence of cross-ownership.
The control coeﬃcients also allow one to determine under what voting
conditions other than absolute majority voting it may be possible to divorce
cash ﬂow rights from control. In this case we may deﬁne both necessary
conditions and suﬃcient conditions for control, and show how one may re-
cursively pass from one set of conditions to the other.
4 Conditions for Control
When a shareholder can control a company corresponds to a selection of an
equilibrium in the subgame where shareholders would like to vote manage-
ment out of oﬃce. This subgame - which, of course, will not be reached - may
have several equilibria. One of those is always such that a relative majority
is enough for control.
To see this, consider a ﬁxed ﬁrm and assume that investor i = 1 is its
CEO. Suppose all other shareholders are dissatisﬁed with 1’s performance.
To unseat him, they have to call a shareholder assembly and vote him out
of oﬃce. Therefore, each shareholder i = 2, ..., n has two possibilities: either
attend the assembly and vote against management (denoted ai = 1) or stay
home (denoted ai = 0). For the moment, denote by θi the shares owned by
investor i = 1, ..., n.
Let ordinal preferences of investors i = 2, ..., n over outcomes be as fol-
lows. Each shareholder i strictly prefers to attend and vote against manage-
ment over staying home if and only if her vote is pivotal. That is,4
ai = 1 i ai = 0 if and only if
∑
j≥2
ajθj > θ1 ≥
∑
i=j≥2
ajθj
This is because, if the other shareholders (except i and 1) decide to vote
against management and together already command more shares than the
CEO i = 1, then an arbitrarily small cost for attending the shareholder as-
sembly makes it optimal for i to stay home. Likewise, if too few shareholders
decide to attend, so that adding i’s share is insuﬃcient to vote management
out of oﬃce, then it is again optimal to stay home, if attendance carries a
small cost.
4Assume that at a tie the CEO’s vote is pivotal. Then the challengers need to combine
a strictly larger share than the CEO.
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On the other hand, if, given the other shareholders’ (except i and 1)
decisions, adding i’s share turns the vote from failing to unseating the CEO,
then i strictly prefers ai = 1 over ai = 0. With these (purely ordinal)
preferences the following is straightforward.
Proposition 6 In the voting game there exists a pure Nash equilibrium with∑n
i=2 ai = 0 if and only if θ1 ≥ θi for all i = 2, ..., n.
Proof. “if” Suppose θ1 ≥ θi for all i = 2, ..., n. We claim that ai = 0 for
all i = 2, ..., n is a Nash equilibrium. Consider any shareholder i = 2, ..., n.
Given that all other shareholders decide to stay home, aj = 0 for all j = i
with j ≥ 2, the move to unseat the CEO can only succeed if θi > θ1. Since
this is ruled out by hypothesis, ai = 0 is optimal. Since i was arbitrary, this
veriﬁes that ai = 0 for all i = 2, ..., n is an equilibrium.
“only if” Suppose there is some i = 2, ..., n such that θi > θ1. Assume that
there is an equilibrium with
∑n
j=2 aj = 0. Then aj = 0 for all j = 2, ..., n.
But shareholder i can proﬁtably deviate to ai = 1, because her share is
suﬃcient to vote management out of oﬃce by hypothesis - a contradiction.
This Proposition eﬀectively states that a relative majority is enough for
control, if in the subgame, where all shareholders (other than the CEO)
would want to vote management out of oﬃce, a particular equilibrium is
being played - the one where no shareholder challenges.
Determining control under such an equilibrium is somewhat more in-
volved. Again, denote by ci = (ci1, ..., cim) ∈ {0, 1}m the (row) vector of
control coeﬃcients for investor i = 1, ..., n and by C = [cij] the n×m matrix
of control coeﬃcients. The latter (viewed as reals) must solve the following
system of inequalities and equalities:
[ϑi − ϑj + (ci − cj) Σ] diag (ci) ≥ 0 for all j = 1, ..., n and
ci [I − diag (ci)] = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n, (16)
and eC = e
By the second condition cij ∈ {0, 1} and, by the ﬁrst, cij = 1 implies ϑij +∑m
k=1 cikσkj ≥ ϑhj +
∑m
k=1 chkσkj for all h = 1, ..., n. The last condition
ensures that for each company j = 1, ...,m there is some investor i = 1, ..., n
such that cij = 1.
Note the formal similarity of these conditions to problem (13). In general,
let Nit ⊂ {1, ..., n} be a subset of the set of investors with cardinality n − t
which does not contain i, i.e. |Nit| = n − t and i /∈ Nit, and deﬁne control
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coeﬃcients Ct =
[
ctij
]
of order t = 1, ..., n− 1 as (real) solutions to
max
Ct
eCte (17)
s.t.
[
ϑi + c
t
iΣ−
∑
j∈Nit
(
ϑj + c
t
jΣ
)]
diag
(
cti
) ≥ 0 for all Nit ⊂ {1, ..., n}
and cti
[
I − diag (cti)] = 0 for all i = 1, ..., n,
and eC ≤ e
Hence, for t = 1 this boils down to the suﬃcient condition (13) (resp. (12))
for control. And for t = n− 1 it boils down to the necessary condition (16)
for control. Note again that the second of the three constraints is only there
to ensure that ctij ∈ {0, 1} for all i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ...,m, and t = 1, ..., n−1.
Passing from the suﬃcient condition to the necessary condition requires
an algorithm for computing the control coeﬃcients under investor ‘coalitions’
of varying sizes (the Nit). First the largest coalition is tested for control. The
control coeﬃcients for that coalition are then calculated, and the economy
then redeﬁned (as in Section 3.1) so that those controlling investors are given
full ownership of the ﬁrm. The algorithm then passes to the next level of
coalitions, the control coeﬃcients are recalculated, etc. and the algorithm
proceeds until the necessary condition is reached. Structured in this way, each
control coeﬃcient calculation captures a new level of ownership not found in
earlier stages–and by deﬁnition, the control coeﬃcients of the previous stages
must satisfy the inequalities of the following stages. This may be seen simply
by comparing the suﬃcient and the necessary conditions–those investors who
exercise full control at the suﬃciency level, by having imputed shares greater
than the entire population of other investors, must also have imputed shares
greater than each investor–and thus full control at the necessary level. The
development of this algorithm to calculate control coeﬃcients from empirical
data is a subject of current research (see Concluding Remarks).
5 Concluding Remarks and Current Research
In estimating the degree of ownership concentration in East Asia andWestern
Europe Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2001) have found that
the primary mechanisms for separating ownership from control appear to
be dual-class shares and the pyramid structure. Pyramids, for example,
are particularly prevalent in East Asia, where they comprise nearly 40%
of the ﬁrms (nearly 67% in Indonesia alone).5 Cross-ownership structures,
5Claessens et al. (2000) p. 93.
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although not insigniﬁcant, do not appear to play as important a role (the
largest examples being, for example, only 2.69% of ﬁrms controlled at the
20% level in Germany, and 2.04% in Norway6). The foregoing analysis sheds
light upon one possible reason for the low presence of cross-ownership, in
that the methods of calculating voting rights from cash-ﬂow rights lead to
an underestimate of the separation of ownership from control in the presence
of cross-ownership. Using accounting identities we demonstrate that it is
possible to recover the control of a ﬁrm from the underlying cross-ownership
structure in a way that preserves all possible connections between ﬁrms in an
economy. It is also shown that a given economy may have multiple compatible
ownership structures, in which control over both cash-ﬂow rights and voting
rights may either be jointly held or completely separated.
Of greater interest perhaps is how the identities and control coeﬃcients
ﬁt into a full theoretical model of cross-ownership, in which ﬁrm investment
levels are optimally selected by investors, and industry ownership structures
are then determined. This would allow one to assess the general existence
and likelihood of various cross-ownership structures (including pyramid struc-
tures) arising as the result of optimizing behavior on the part of investors and
ﬁrms. As a full theoretical treatment appears to be lacking in the current
literature, current research is focusing upon such a model of cross-ownership.
In addition, as deﬁned in Section 4 the control coeﬃcients also allow
for empirical estimation of the degree of cross-ownership from data, using
a recursive algorithm which traverses from the suﬃcient to the necessary
conditions for control. Using this algorithm it should be possible to extract
the controlling interest structure from data which uses the entire matrix of
cross-ownership linkages. Naturally the application of such an algorithm is
hampered not only by the size of such a matrix (which may be on the order
of thousands of ﬁrms) but also by the fact that all possible coalitions must
be tested in order to calculate the control coeﬃcients of a particular coalition
size. This is a combinatorial problem which, as the number of ﬁrms rises,
becomes computationally prohibitive. For example, with only 1,000 ﬁrms
one must naively check
(
999
1,000−t
)
, t = 1 . . . 999 diﬀerent ﬁrm combinations for
each t, for each ﬁrm, in order to calculate the control coeﬃcients. Methods
of optimizing the computation of these and similar conditions and applying
the control coeﬃcient technique to data are also currently underway.
6Faccio and Lang (2001) p. 17.
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